The Herd Is Heading For A Cliff
Submitted by Jim Quinn via The Burning Platform blog,
You would think investors (muppets) would be grateful for the extended topping process of the stock market, as it has given them the opportunity to exit before the inevitable crash. As CNBC and the rest of the mainstream media spin bullish stories to keep the few remaining mom and pop investors sedated and the millions of passive working Americans invested in their 401ks, the Wall Street rigging machine siphons off billions in ill-gotten gains, while absconding with fees for worthless advice.
Does the average schmuck know the S&P 500 stood at 2,063 on November 21, 2014 and currently sits at 2,056, thirteen months later? Based on the media narrative, we are still in the midst of a raging bull market. John Hussman provides the counterpoint to this narrative with unequivocal factual evidence based upon a hundred years of stock market data and valuations. Anyone investing in today’s market should expect ZERO returns over the next ten years and a 40% to 55% plunge in the near future. And as a cherry on top, a recession has arrived.
The summary of this outlook is
straightforward. I view the equity market as being in the late-stage top
formation of the third financial bubble in 15 years. Based on a century
of evidence relating the most historically reliable valuation measures
to actual subsequent market returns, neither a market plunge of 40-55%
over the completion of the current cycle, nor the expectation of zero
10-12 year S&P 500 nominal total returns, nor the likelihood of
substantially negative 10-12 year real returns should be viewed as
worst-case scenarios – they are all actually run-of-the-mill
expectations from current extremes. Based on the joint behavior of the
most reliable leading economic measures (particularly new orders plus
order backlogs, minus inventories), widening credit spreads, and clearly
deteriorating market internals, our economic outlook has also moved to a
guarded expectation of a U.S. recession.
Because speculation tends to be
indiscriminate, the most reliable measure of a robust willingness to
speculate is the uniformity of market action across a broad range of
individual stocks and security types. An overvalued market populated
with speculators who still have the bit in their teeth will tend to hold
up or advance further despite valuation extremes. Because of the
Federal Reserve’s relentless and intentional encouragement of
speculation in the half-cycle since 2009, even measures of overvalued,
overbought, overbullish extremes – which had historically been followed
almost invariably by market collapses in prior market cycles – were
followed instead by further market advances.
John Hussman, inconveniently for those of a bullish ilk, notes that market internals have deteriorated rapidly, with only a few beloved, overvalued, overhyped tech stocks holding up the market. Most stocks are already in a bear market. Corporate profits are falling. PE ratios are high. Consumer spending is anemic. The jobs growth narrative is false. Real household income is at 1989 levels.
Based on history, current conditions have only been seen at major tops. I’m sure this time will be different and Cramer, along with all the highly paid Wall Street shills, will be right.
Now that market internals have
clearly deteriorated following overvalued, overbought, overbullish
extremes, with reliable valuation measures at obscene levels and
emerging economic weakness, a century of history suggests that the stock
market is vulnerable to the risk of severe losses. Investors should not
assume that the “support” that keeps losses relatively shallow during a
drawn-out topping process will persist. There’s some truth in the old
saying “the bigger the top, the steeper the drop.” Only a few points in
history have seen the S&P 500 within 3% of a record high, with both
overvaluation and unfavorable market internals during at least 80% of
the prior 26-week period. Aside from points in recent months, the other
points were major tops in 2007, 2000, 1972, 1969, and 1961.
I really do implore investors who
could not comfortably ride out a market collapse similar to 2000-2002 or
2007-2009, or who rely on their assets to finance near-term spending
plans, to shift their risk exposure down to a level that could tolerate
that outcome. Understand that while valuations have been hostile for
years, and while overvalued, overbought, overbullish conditions have
repeatedly emerged in the recent half-cycle without effect, the hinge
that supported continued gains was a persistent willingness to
speculate, as conveyed by uniformly favorable market internals. That
support has dropped away. Ignore that key distinction at enormous risk.
The market behavior we’ve observed in recent quarters is fully
consistent with an extended top formation. With credit spreads
predictably widening in successively larger spikes, that formation
appears increasingly vulnerable to a steep vertical break of prior
support.
Still, we doubt that most speculators
think about the decision to accept market exposure in such a systematic
way. On that point, Robert Prechter of EWI offered a brilliant
perspective last week to describe the typical behavior of speculators.
He observed, “In neither case – buying or selling – is there any thought
about taking on risk, rationally or otherwise. In both cases, they are
unconsciously acting to reduce risk, thanks to the emotionally
satisfying impulse to herd. Herds act to gain sustenance or avoid
danger. Gazelles may lope together toward the water hole or dash in a
herd from predators. The goal, albeit unconscious, of both types of
actions is to reduce risk. Likewise, in market advances speculators herd
as if trying to gain sustenance; and in market declines they herd as if
trying to avoid getting killed… Subjectively, i.e. in their own minds,
speculators perceive greater risk as less risk and less risk as greater
risk. That is why they buy in uptrends and sell in downtrends. In the
former case, they behave as if the herd is leading them to sustenance,
and in the latter case they behave as if the herd is leading them away
from danger. Ironically, the truth is wholly the opposite.”
At present, we observe a herd at the
peak of a valuation cliff, where an increasing proportion of the herd is
backing away. It’s increasingly urgent to dig in one’s hooves to keep
from dashing over the edge. We can do little for those who insist on
remaining in full gallop, imagining that sustenance awaits them ahead.
How did the S&P 500 trace out a
total return of zero between 2000 and the end of 2011? By first losing
half its value, then more than doubling, then losing more than half its
value, and then doubling again. Across history, extreme valuations have
invariably been followed by similar behavior – wide cyclical swings, yet
only modest overall returns over the following decade.
After years of Fed-induced
yield-seeking speculation that has driven equity valuations to the
second most extreme point of overvaluation in history (and the single
most extreme point on the basis of median valuations), investors have
somehow convinced themselves that this time will be different; that this
time the market will maintain at a permanently high plateau. That
belief is nothing new – it’s the same delusion that investors have held
at speculative peaks across history, refusing to accept the familiar
signs of danger until the equally familiar losses were conclusively in
hand.
Charles Mackay, Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds
Read Hussman’s Weekly Letter
ReplyDeleteIf you only have time to read here is the most important part of this blog!
Anyone fully invested in the stock market at this point in time is delusional and mad.
Now is the time to regain your senses and stop playing in this rigged Wall Street game.
If you think i kid you read it all.